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Abstract
This paper tests the impact of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WRA) by looking at
changes in the behaviour of a panel of workplaces in the Illawarra Region of NSW
between 1996 and 2004. The results support the proposition that the major impact
has been on the level of unionisation and union density in these workplaces. There
was virtually no expansion in the use of enterprise bargaining or AWAs, although
there was a small but significant increase in non-union agreement making. Rather
than encourage the use of single jurisdictions to register awards and collective
agreements, in the Illawarra at least, there was a strong trend to dual State and
Federal jurisdictions. Thus the WRA has been relatively ineffective in achieving
flexibility and decentralised employee relations goals but has resulted in a high level
of decollectivisation.
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Introduction
The Commonwealth Workplace Relations Act 1996, introduced by the incoming
Liberal/National Party Coalition Government, became effective in 1997. Originally
expected to involve a substantial shift in Australian industrial relations, Senate
amendments greatly reduced the more radical elements in the new Act. Further
attempts in 2000 and 2001 to amend the Act were also defeated in the Senate.
Consequently, the industrial relations environment between 1997 and 2005 has only
been a partial reflection of the directions intended by the Howard Coalition
Government.
Perhaps because of this, there has been some debate as to the exact purpose of this
Act. Vernon Winley from the Business Council of Australia writing in the Australian
Bulletin of Labour (1997:82) saw it as a means of providing a more enterprisefocused approach to employee relations that would allow Australian businesses to
respond more effectively to international competition, that is to foster increased and
more innovative uses of enterprise bargaining. As well as this decentralisation of
employee relations, it was to introduce decollectivisation in the form of individual
contracts or Australian Workplace Agreements. Thirdly, it was hoped that it would
enable workplaces to avoid the costs of operating in duplicate systems by moving
entirely into either State or the Federal jurisdiction.
Others, such as Lee and Peetz (1998:5), had a more critical view, arguing that “the
objective of the Act may be to provide a framework for cooperative workplace
relations, but the purpose is to weaken unions ….” Deery and Mitchell (1999),
quoted in Riley (2003:151), reiterated this position arguing that the agenda since 1997
can be described as “individualism and union exclusion”.
It is now some eight years since the Workplace Relations Act (WRA) became
operative and the Coalition Government, now with control of the Senate, is at last in a
position to introduce its preferred framework for industrial relations in Australia.
New initiatives involving overriding State legislation to enforce a single Federal
system, expand the use of individual agreements, and reduce the number of allowable
conditions under awards have been mooted under its WorkChoices proposals. This is
thus an opportune time to examine the extent to which competing objectives of the
original Act have been achieved before the environment is affected by new
amendments. As no full-scale industrial relations survey has been conducted since
the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in 1995 (AWIRS95), a full
testing of its impact is not possible.
However, in conjunction with AWIRS95, a regional study was conducted in the
Illawarra region of NSW, the Illawarra Regional Workplace Industrial Relations
Survey or IRWIRS96. A small scale follow-up of that study was undertaken in 2004,
which duplicated some of the original questions. Using that data, and particularly
results from a subset of those firms that were included in both the 1996 and 2004
samples, some indications of the impact of the WRA can be made in terms of the
spread of enterprise bargaining, use of non-union and individual bargaining, union
density and jurisdictional choice. The results of that panel study are presented below.
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Changes in National and Regional Industrial Relations Environment, 1996 -2004
Two main features of the industrial relations environment require consideration: the
regulatory environment created through legislation, and the economic environment.
These are considered in turn below.
The WRA provided a framework that could facilitate a shift of industrial power
towards employers, by encouraging more direct negotiation between employees and
employers, bypassing union intermediaries. The main features of the WRA included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

significant limitation of the matters about which the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission may make awards to twenty ‘allowable matters’ under
normal circumstances;
certified agreements of a collective nature may be between a business or
corporation and a union (S170LJ), or a non-union agreement between a
corporation and its employees (170LK);
introduction of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) between
individual employers and individual employees;
lodgement of AWAs with the new Employment Advocate;
no longer is there a need to be a federal award respondent to access any of the
above agreements or otherwise participate in the Act ;
exclusion of unions from the processes of AWA ratification;
provision for registration of enterprise unions;
some increased restrictions on right of entry of union officials to workplaces;
introduction of protected industrial action by employers or employees during
bargaining periods, whilst introducing penalties for ‘unprotected’ action during
the period of agreements;
strengthening of provisions against secondary boycotts; and
abolition of the Australian Industrial Court.

These aspects of the WRA have been responsible for, or at least complemented, a
major restructuring of the industrial relations system in Australia. Almost 40 per cent
of the workforce now have their wages and conditions determined principally by
collective enterprise agreements, with awards providing a minimum set of standards,
which are the basis for the ‘no disadvantage test’ applied by the AIRC for certifying
collective agreements. Awards also provide a ‘social safety net’ more broadly, as the
sole basis of wages and conditions for about a fifth of the workforce, principally the
low-paid and non-unionised (Watts and Mitchell 2004). On this basis, the ACTU
periodically submits applications to the AIRC for increases in award minimum wages.
AWAs have been vigorously promoted by the federal government and Employment
Advocate. In some cases they have been used by employers as a means of
undercutting union collective agreements, but they have only been taken up by
employers employing 2 per cent of the workforce, with about 38 per cent of the
workforce covered by unregistered individual agreements (ABS 2002; Sheldon and
Thornthwaite 2001; Watts and Mitchell 2004). In terms of industrial relations
processes, there has been a growth in litigation of disputes through ordinary courts
(Frazer 1997, 1998 and 1999; Catanzariti and Shariff 2001 and 2002; Catanzariti,
Shariff and Brown 2003; Sheldon and Thornthwaite 2001), and a rapid increase in
employers’ use of the lockout (Briggs 2004; Sheldon and Thornthwaite 2001, 2002).
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The industrial relations actors also have been affected significantly by the WRA.
Trade union membership, which accounted for over 50 per cent of the workforce in
the mid 1970s and still 40 per cent in the early 1990s (Sadler and Fagan 2004), has
continued to decline since 1996, to 23 per cent of the Australian workforce in 2004,
and only 18 per cent of the private sector workforce (ABS 2004). Although this
decline has been the result of a number of structural factors, David Peetz has
demonstrated that the restrictions imposed by the WRA have contributed significantly
to the continuing decline of union membership post-1996 (Peetz 1998). Recent
statistics for membership of employer associations are less readily available.
However, employer association membership fell between 1990 and 1995, particularly
in the private sector, from 82 to 74 per cent of workplaces, according to AWIRS
(Morehead et al. 1997: 89). Membership might be expected to have declined further
because of the new regime of enterprise bargaining. In Britain after industrial
relations reform during the 1980s encouraged a shift from industry level to enterprise
bargaining, employer associations have ‘suffered widespread decline’ (Sheldon and
Thornthwaite 1999: 213). In New Zealand after the 1991 Employment Contracts Act
largely eliminated multi-employer bargaining, industry-based associations virtually
disappeared. In Australia it seems that employer associations have declined since
1996, and that there is greater competition amongst them for employer support. At
least some Australian organisations, such as the Association of Employers of
Waterfront Labour, have disappeared altogether. There also is evidence that the role
of employer associations, and the services they provide members, have changed since
1996. For example, many associations now offer enterprise bargaining support and a
greater range of technical services to their members, often on a fee for service basis
(Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1999: 73, 201, 218; Bell 1994).
At the same time, the NSW industrial relations legislation moved in the opposite
direction to the federal WRA, in confirming the roles of awards, the NSW Industrial
Relations Commission and unions. The NSW system, which retains significant
coverage in that State, does not restrict industrial action in the way that the WRA
does, and has no equivalent of AWAs. It might be expected that unions would favour
remaining in the State system, whereas some employers would favour the WRA. This
may impact upon the distribution of State and federal award and agreement coverage
in the Illawarra.
The other major determinant of the industrial relations environment is the state of the
economy, and particularly the labour market. At a national level the economic
environment has not changed significantly since AWIRS95. Growth in national GDP
slowed marginally while employment increased. However, there was a significant
fall in interest rates whilst inflation and unemployment rates declined1. Generally this
indicated a buoyant economy. At the regional level, the Illawarra economy was
performing poorly compared to national conditions in 1996/7, when IRWIRS96 was
conducted, with falling trade conditions for many firms, stagnation in key sectors, and
declining employment and consumer spending. The rate of unemployment was
significantly higher in the Illawarra, at 13.5 per cent (Markey et al. 2001: 11-12).
1

Annual growth in real GDP slowed from 4.1% in 1994-95 to 3.6% in 2003-4. Unemployment fell to
5.8%, the lowest since 1976-77. The CPI increased by 3.2% in 1994-95 and 2.4% in 2003-04
(Treasury 2004(a), 2004(b)). Interest rates (90 day bill rate) declined from over seven percent in 1995
to just under five and half percent by the end of 2004 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2005).
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Since 1997, the regional economy has become far more buoyant and unemployment
has declined, to 6.4 per cent in the Wollongong Local Government Area (LGA) in
March 2002. However, unemployment rose again, to 9.1 per cent in Wollongong, 8.6
per cent in Shellharbour, and 8.8 per cent in Shoalhaven LGAs in March 2004.
Unemployment remains higher than the national average of 6.6 per cent, and for NSW
at 6.0 per cent (IRIS Research 2004: 7-8).
Improvements in economic conditions at the national and regional level might be
expected to lead to increased industrial action. However, as shown above, there has
been steady economic growth over the past ten years without any major disruptions to
the downward trend in industrial activity indicators. Thus, with strike indicators such
as working days lost at historically low levels, it is clear that changes in the regulatory
environment, as briefly outlined above, are more likely to produce the greatest
impacts upon the pattern of industrial relations in the current era (Hodgkinson and
Perera 2004).

Methodology
In order to identify elements of regional industrial relations change, a survey of
Illawarra workplaces was conducted in May/June 2004, IRWIRS 2004, to compare
with the earlier IRWIRS96. A range of questions were selected that could identify the
impact of the regulatory system upon the nature of the industrial relations system and
the state of the parties to it. The survey data sought for comparison between 1996 and
2004 related to the following issues:
• employer association membership and types of services used;
• trade union membership, number of unions, and delegate presence;
• incidence of direct forms of employee participation (such as teamwork and
quality circles);
• incidence of indirect or representative forms of employee participation other
than unions;
• payment systems, including incidence of awards, certified enterprise
agreements, AWAs, and informal agreements;
• workforce reductions; and
• industrial action.
The 2004 questionnaire was directed towards employee relations managers, as with
the main component of IRWIRS96, and the specific questions concerning the issues
listed above were identical between the two surveys. However, the 2004 survey was
shorter than IRWIRS96, and unlike the original survey the 2004 version was
conducted by telephone rather than face-to-face interview. An initial comparison of
the results from the two surveys was developed (Hodgkinson and Markey 2005).
The 2004 survey covered 212 workplaces drawn from the same population as the
1996 survey, which covered 194 workplaces representing 25 per cent of all
workplaces in the region with 20 or more employees. The 2004 workplaces employed
just under 20,000 people, with an average employment size of 92. Firms in the
database from which the sample was drawn all employed 20 or more employees in
1996. However, some of the firms had downsized or restructured into separate units
in the intervening eight years, such that 17 per cent are now classified as small (less
4

than 20 employees). In addition, the 2004 sample had a higher proportion of
manufacturing firms than the 1996 sample. As a consequence, the 2004 sample
contained more of the larger firms than in 1996.
These differences in the structures of the two samples raised some concerns that the
reported changes in behaviour in the initial comparison might be due to sample
characteristics rather than true responses to the elements of the Workplace Relations
Act. Consequently, a panel data set of 89 firms was extracted from the two surveys
comprising firms which were included in both surveys. A similar analysis of changes
in behaviour since the introduction of this Act was conducted. In this case we can be
confident that we are recording true changes, rather than structural sample
differences. However, the behaviour changes shown by the panel dataset were in most
cases similar to those found between the two whole samples, confirming the results
originally presented. The only significant difference was that the firms in the panel
dataset had a higher proportion of union presence in 2004, and a higher proportion of
workplaces with union delegates in both 1996 and 2004, than the full sample dataset.
The 1996 and 2004 mean results from the panel data set and the full samples for all
2004 variables are shown in Appendix A.

Results
Based on the foregoing discussion of the intentions of the Workplace Relations Act
1996, a number of hypotheses regarding expected firm behaviour have been
developed. These are tested using statistical tests including a test of significant
differences in proportions for matched variables, prior to and after the introduction of
the WRA (two related samples McNemar Test or Matched samples T-test), and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov z – test or the Mann-Whitney test, which tests whether the
panel dataset has similar characteristics to the full sample database. These results are
presented in Table 1 and discussed below.
Hypothesis 1: That the use of awards declined after the introduction of the WRA.
As noted in Appendix A, the proportion of panel firms with awards was 96.6 per cent
in 1996 and 95.7 per cent in 2004. In the sample as a whole, the proportion fell from
98 per cent to 94 per cent over the same time period. As shown in Table 1, there has
been no significant decline in the number of panel workplaces with awards since the
introduction of the WRA. Further, the z-test indicates that this result is typical of the
sample as a whole. Awards remained the basis of the industrial relations system in
the Illawarra under the WRA.
Hypothesis 2: That there has been a growth in the use of (a) certified collective
enterprise agreements, and (b) non-certified enterprise agreements since the
introduction of the WRA.
Both these hypotheses can be rejected. There has been no increase in the proportion
of workplaces with collective enterprise agreements since the WRA. The percentage
of workplaces with certified enterprise agreements in the panel dataset fell slightly
from 43.8 per cent to 43.0 per cent. Thus it appears that by 1996, those firms which
wanted enterprise agreements had already established them under the provisions of
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the earlier Industrial Relations Reform Act of 1993. The changes to encourage
enterprise bargaining in the WRA had no impact on the decision of firms to move to
these agreements. Further, there was only a marginal increase in the proportion of
workplaces in the panel dataset with non-certified collective agreements from 24 per
cent to 26 percent. Neither of these changes was statistically significant, indicating
that the WRA had no impact on the decision to move to enterprise agreements as a
means of determining wages and conditions. The z – test results indicate that this was
true of the sample as a whole. However, the average number of certified agreements
in these workplaces rose from 2.9 to 5.7, although the high variability in the data
indicated that this change was not significant.
The WRA encouraged firms to bargain directly with their employers, rather than
through a union (Buchanan et al. 1998). There was some evidence that this strategy
had been successful. In 1996, there was a significant difference between having a
certified enterprise agreement if there was a union in the workplace (37% of all firms)
and having one if there was no union (7% of all firms). By 2004, there was no
significant difference with the proportion of unionised workplaces with enterprise
agreements dropping to 29 per cent and the proportion of non-union workplaces with
enterprise agreements rising to 14 per cent. There was no significant difference
between having a non-certified collective agreement or not by union status of the
workplace in either year. Thus there is some indication that workplaces using
enterprise agreements have increased their usage under the WRA, and also that some
non-union negotiated enterprise agreements are in place, although the proportion of
workplaces where this is occurring is not high.

Hypothesis 3: Increased use of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs).
AWAs were intended to be the main mechanism within the WRA to achieve nonunion agreements (Rimmer 1997). This hypothesis cannot be tested statistically as
there were no provisions for individual registered agreements prior to the WRA.
However, only 1.1 per cent of workplaces in the panel dataset had AWAs in 2004.
This is below the national average of 2 per cent (ABS 2002). Thus this proposition
can be rejected, in that eight years after the operation of the WRA, little use was being
made of AWAs in the Illawarra. The z – test results indicate that this finding was true
of the sample as a whole.
Hypothesis 4: That there has been a decline in (a) number of unionised workplaces2
and in (b) union density.
It has been argued that the real purpose of the WRA was to weaken unions through a
range of provisions that lessened their powers to operate and affect their financial
viability (Lee and Peetz 1998). However, another perspective is that the decline in
membership is a response to members’ dissatisfaction with the performance of unions
(Costa 1997). Whatever the reason, the decline in union membership within the
Australian workforce has been repeated in the Illawarra. Thus, both these hypotheses
are accepted.

2

Defined as in AWIRS95 as workplaces with at least one union member.
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There was a decline in union density in the workforces of firms in the panel dataset
from 66 per cent in 1996 to 43 per cent in 2004, compared with a decline to 39 per
cent for the total sample. Average employment in these firms remained relatively
constant at 91-92 employees. However, the average number of unionists fell from 84
to 39 in these workplaces. This decline in union density, which reflects the trend
throughout the Australian workforce, was associated with a decline in the proportion
of unionised workplaces from 74 per cent in 1996 to 61 per cent in 2004. Moreover,
an even larger decline occurred in the sample as a whole from 74 per cent in 1996 to
51 per cent in 2004. The average number of unions per workplace fell from 2.3 to 1.9
over the same period. These differences indicate that the panel dataset firms were
significantly different from the others in the sample, containing a higher proportion of
union workplaces and members. The relevance of this finding is discussed below.
Further analysis of this fall in union density demonstrates that the majority of the
decline in union membership occurred in the private sector. Average union
membership fell from 49 to 30 per cent in private workplaces, and from 65 to 53 per
cent in public workplaces. There was no significant change in the proportion of union
members in mining and manufacturing workplaces, although it did fall from 51 to 43
per cent. The fall in public service workplaces from 62 to 48 per cent was also not
significant. However, there was a highly significant drop in union density in private
sector service industry workplaces from 50 per cent in 1996 to 29 per cent in 2004.
Hypothesis 5: That there has been a decline in union delegate presence and in the
number of delegates in workplaces.
The proportion of workplaces with a union delegate presence decreased very
marginally from 53 per cent to 52 per cent in the panel dataset firms. For the samples
as a whole, it dropped from 47 per cent to 39 per cent of workplaces. However, the
average number of delegates in workplaces that did have delegates rose from 2.5 in
1996 to 3.3 in 2004, although this change was not statistically significant. Thus this
hypothesis is rejected. The incidence of union delegates in workplaces remained
generally stable in the panel dataset between 1996 and 2004. However, the z – test
results indicate that this finding was not true of the full survey database. There the
drop in union presence was paralleled by a drop in union delegate presence.
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Table 1: Results of Hypotheses Tests
Hypothesis

Panel Data only (p value1
And Outcome)

1. Decline in use of
awards
2(a). Growth in certified
enterprise agreements
2(b). Growth in noncertified enterprise
agreements
3. Increased use of
AWAs
4(a). Decline in
proportion of unionised
workplaces
4 (b). Decline in union
density
5(a). Decline in delegate
presence
5(b) decline in number of
delegates
6. Decline in industrial
action past twelve months
7. Increased use of lockout powers
8. Decline in membership
of employer associations
9(a). Drop in State Award
jurisdiction
9(b). Increase in Federal
Award jurisdiction
9(c). Increase of awards
in both jurisdictions
9(d). Decline in
agreements in State
jurisdiction

.254
Not supported
.500
Not supported
.430
Not supported

Test of Independence
between Panel and Rest
of sample2 and Outcome
.557
No difference in results
.254
No difference in results
.409
No difference in results

n.a.
Not supported
.002**
Supported

1.00
No difference in results
.009**
Panel results different

.000*** [see note 1]
Supported
1.000
Not supported
.795 [see note 1]
Not supported
.000***
Supported
n.a.
Not supported
.008**
Supported
.054**
Supported
.593
Not supported
.054**
Supported
.084
Not supported [wrong sign,
agreements
in
State
jurisdiction increased]
.006**
Not supported [wrong sign,
agreements
in
Federal
jurisdiction decreased]
.133
Not supported

.001*** [see note 2]
Panel results different
.004**
Panel results different
.120 [see note 2]
No difference in results
.463
No difference in results
1.000
No difference in results
1.00
No difference in results
.203
No difference in results
.690
No difference in results
.101
No difference in results
.824
No difference in results

9(e). Iincrease in
agreements in Federal
jurisdiction
9(f). Increase in
agreements in both
jurisdictions

.781
No difference in results

1.000
No difference in results

1 Significance measured by McNemar test due to qualitative (binary) data.
2 Significance measured by Two Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov z-test
Note 1: Significance measured by Matched Samples T-test method as quantitative data available.
Note 2: Independence of samples measured by Mann-Whitney test as quantitative data available.
*** Significant at 99 per cent confidence level
** Significant at 95 per cent confidence level
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This observation generates a further hypothesis that union presence did not decline in
workplaces which had delegates in 1996. This hypothesis can be accepted, with a
highly significant relationship between having a delegate in the workplace in 1996
and still having a trade union in that workplace in 2004. Of those workplaces that did
have a trade union in 1996, 86 per cent that also had delegates in 1996 still had a trade
union in 2004. Of workplaces which had a union in 1996 but no delegate, only 59 per
cent still had a union, while 41 per cent no longer had a union. Thus the decline in
union presence in the firms in the panel dataset is clearly more prevalent in
workplaces with no delegate structure in place. This result clearly supports the
‘organising strategy’ approach of the trade union movement to the pressures against
unionism in the WRA (ACTU 2003) and confirms previously recognised patterns
(Peetz 1998:48-9, 115-16)
Hypothesis 6: That there has been a decline in industrial action.
This hypothesis is accepted. The proportion of workplaces in the panel dataset that
had industrial action in the twelve months prior to each survey fell from 27 per cent in
1996 to 19 per cent in 2004. For the complete survey database, the decline was very
similar being from 26 per cent to 17 per cent. As shown in Appendix A, declines
occurred in strikes, stop-work meetings and picketing. However, there was an
increased incidence of over-time bans, work-to-rule and go-slow actions. The decline
in industrial disputes would appear to reflect the influence of the provisions in the
WRA constraining standard strike action to ‘protected periods’ during enterprise
bargaining, although even work-to-rule and go-slow actions are covered by the
general constraints on industrial action under the WRA. Their increase may reflect the
influence of the State jurisdiction, discussed below, since there are fewer restraints on
industrial action in the State jurisdiction. An analysis of types of industrial action by
whether or not the workplace had a certified enterprise agreement, did not show
significant differences in the incidence of each type of industrial action. This
indicates that industrial action can occur regardless of the type of payments system in
place. A further analysis did find significant relationships between all forms of
industrial action except ‘go-slows’ with whether the workplace was unionised or not.
No industrial action occurred in any non-unionised workplace in the 2004 panel
dataset firms.
Hypothesis 7: That there was an increased use of ‘lock-outs’.
The WRA allowed firms to lock-out workers during protected bargaining periods, as
well as permitting strike action. However, no lock-outs occurred in the panel dataset
workplaces in the twelve months before the 2004 survey, nor were any recorded in the
1996 survey. Thus this hypothesis is rejected indicating that lock-outs are not a
normally negotiating mechanism in the Illawarra. The z–test indicates that this finding
was also true of the full survey database. Nevertheless, they have been used in the
past, the Joy Manufacturing case being a celebrated early use of this device in the
Illawarra (Ellem, 2001).
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Hypothesis 8: That membership of employer associations declined.
This hypothesis is accepted. The proportion of workplaces that were members of
employer associations was 76 per cent in 1996, and this dropped to 59 per cent by
2004. For the sample as a whole, membership dropped from 73 per cent to 59 per cent
in these years. This drop in membership was statistically significant. The drop in
membership does not seem to be associated with trade union presence in the
workplace. In 1996 firms were significantly more likely to be a member of an
employer association if there was no union in their workplace. In 2004 no significant
relationship existed between the two. The z–test result indicates that the drop in
employer association membership was also found in the sample as a whole.
As shown in Appendix A, the only employer association service to experience a
relative drop in usage was advice on awards and agreements, although this change
was not statistically significant. Usage of other services increased. Those where there
was a significant change were: advice when management negotiating with unions;
representation when negotiating with unions; representation at industrial tribunals;
advice on EEO/AA issues; advice on OH&S issues; and legal advice. This indicates
that employer association services are being used relatively more often for complex
union negotiations and regulated matters.
Hypothesis 9: That there has been a movement towards Federal jurisdiction for
awards and collective agreements.
The introduction of enterprise bargaining, which was argued in terms of the need to
provide flexibility to meet the pressures of global competition, was associated with an
increase in the role of federal bargaining structures. This role was strengthened with
the introduction of individual bargaining structures in the WRA (Sadler and Fagan
2004, Winley 1997). Given this strengthening of the role of federal institutions over
time, a shift from state to federal jurisdiction for both awards and collective
agreements could be expected. There was a drop from 1996 to 2004 in the proportion
of workplaces that only had State awards from 60 per cent to 54 per cent in the panel
dataset firms. The corresponding drop for the samples as a whole was from 63 per
cent to 51 per cent. This change was statistically significant. There was no change in
the proportion of panel dataset firms having awards only in the federal jurisdiction.
The proportion of workplaces with only federal awards in the samples as a whole
declined from 22 per cent in 1996 to 15 per cent in 2004. However, there was a
significant increase in the proportion of firms in the panel dataset with awards in both
jurisdictions, rising from 17 per cent in 1996 to 27 per cent in 2004. The
corresponding movement in the samples as a whole was from 13 per cent to 35 per
cent over these years. Thus, while the state jurisdiction remained the dominant area
for registration of awards, a movement to also register awards in the federal
jurisdiction can be seen, indicating that the WRA has had an influence in this area,
and the hypothesis can be accepted.
However, there was an increase in the proportion of firms which had their certified
collective agreements only registered in the State jurisdiction, rising from 36 per cent
in 1996 to 58 per cent in 2004. This change was statistically significant. There was
also a substantial drop in the proportion of firms who had their certified agreements
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only registered in the federal jurisdiction, from 46 per cent to 18 per cent in 2004.
Again, this change was statistically significant. The proportion of firms which had
agreements registered in both jurisdictions rose from 18 per cent to 25 per cent.
However, this change was not statistically significant. All these results are applicable
to both sets of firms. Thus, not only has the WRA not been associated with a change
of jurisdiction in the registration of agreements towards the federal system, but there
has actually been a significant movement away from the federal jurisdiction to the
NSW State system. Thus this hypothesis is rejected.
Hypothesis 10: That there has been an increase in the use of direct participation
methods (team building, semi-autonomous work groups, total quality management
and quality circles) but no increase in the use of indirect participation methods (JCCs,
taskforces and ad hoc committees).
Direct involvement or participation entails the employee in job or task-orientated
decision making in the production process or other business activities. These
techniques have been associated with increased flexibility and organisational
efficiency, and consequently they have become popular in recent years (Markey
2001). Teamwork is the most rudimentary form of direct participation. Semi or fully
autonomous work groups refer to the degree of decision-making undertaken by teams,
and total quality management (TQM) refers to workplaces organised entirely on a
team basis. Quality circles are problem-solving groups. IRWIRS96 found that the
incidence of these techniques was similar to Australia generally, except that semi or
fully autonomous work groups were less common in the Illawarra, and TQM and
quality circles were a little more common than for Australia as a whole (Markey et al.
2001: 211-12; Morehead et al. 1997: 187-90).
Indirect involvement relates to mechanisms where employees participate in decision
making through elected or appointed representatives on committees or boards.
Generally, consultative committees do not bargain over wages, but may have
jurisdiction over a wide range of conditions. Committees tend to be more common in
public sector workplaces, those that are unionised, larger workplaces and those in the
manufacturing, transport and storage and education sectors (Markey et al. 2001: 215).
As shown in Appendix A, there was increased use of all direct participation methods
in the panel dataset firms. This was paralleled by similar increases in all methods in
the samples as a whole between 1996 and 2004. These changes were strongly
significant for team building, semi-autonomous working groups and quality circles.
The change was not significant for Total Quality Management. However, again as
shown in Appendix A, the use of indirect participation methods also increased over
the 1996 – 2004 time period. These changes were equally as significant as those
occurring in the direct methods. These results are shown in Table 2. Thus while there
has been an increased usage of participation methods in the Illawarra, there is no
evidence of a movement towards direct methods away from indirect methods, which
are more often associated with union participation (Markey et al. 2001:215). Further,
the z – test results indicate that these findings are also applicable to the full survey
database firms.
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Table 2: Changes in Use of Direct and Indirect Participation Methods in
Illawarra
Hypothesis 10

Panel Data only (p value1
And Outcome)

Direct
Participation
Methods
Use of Team Building .000***
increased
Supported

Use of Semi-autonomous
Work Groups increased
Use of Total Quality
Management increased
Use of Quality Circles
increased
Indirect
Participation
Methods
No significant increase in
use of Joint Consultative
Committees(JCC)
No significant increase in
use of Taskforces and Ad
Hoc Committees

Test of Independence
between Panel and Rest
of sample2 and Outcome

1.000
No difference in results

.000***
Supported
.212
Not supported
.000***
Supported

1.000
No difference in results
.401
No difference in results
.889
No difference in results

.000***
Not supported

.124
No difference in results

.022**
Not supported

.566
No difference in results

1 Significance measured by McNemar Test
2 Significance measured by two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov z–test.
*** Significant at 99 per cent confidence level
** Significant at 95 per cent confidence level

Broader Application of Panel Results
The results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov z–tests indicate that the panel dataset
firms only differed from the rest of the sample in one particular set of characteristics.
They had a higher proportion of workplaces with a union presence, higher union
density and higher union delegate presence in their workplaces than the rest of the
sample. This stronger union presence may have eventuated from the situation where
the panel firms are possibly older than those in the full sample, having all been in
existence in 1996. As such, they may be more representative of the ‘old’ industrial
environment of the Illawarra (Markey et al. 2001:9).
This stronger union presence in the panel dataset could result in these firms being less
able to move in the ways intended by the WRA due to organised workforce
resistance. Thus, for example, the increase in enterprise agreements registered in the
State jurisdiction, and the decline in registration in the federal jurisdiction may be the
result of union power forcing employers to agree to move into a judicial system that is
considered to be more supportive of union negotiations. The low take-up of AWAs
could be similarly explained. However, the z – test results indicate that these findings
are common for the rest of the sample database firms, which have lower union
presence, lower union density and lower delegate presence in their workplaces. Thus
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the choice of State jurisdiction for the registration of enterprise agreements does not
seem to be influenced by union presence in the workplace. This result is confirmed
through cross-tabulation analysis. For both the panel dataset and the full survey
database firms, there was no significant difference on whether firms used only the
state jurisdiction for enterprise agreements as to whether they had a trade union or
not. Indeed, those firms with no union in both sets had a higher propensity to use
only the State system, while those with unions had a slightly higher use of either the
federal only or registration in both systems.3
Overall, it has been demonstrated that the trends shown in the panel dataset firms are
typical of those of the 2004 survey firms as a whole, and by inference, of the
population of Illawarra medium and large sized firms as a whole. The question of
whether the Illawarra findings can be extended to the rest of New South Wales and
Australia can only be speculated upon, as no comparable database of post-AWIRS
behaviours are available for these larger geographic areas. Markey et al. (2001:394397) concluded that the Illawarra had a distinctive regional industrial relations
environment in 1996. However, Hodgkinson and Markey (2005) argued, based on a
comparison of the full 2004 survey database outcomes with those of IRWIRS96 and
AWIRS95, that much of this distinctiveness had now diminished. If this is the case,
then these results at least provide some indications of how state and national
behaviours have moved in response to the Workplace Relations Act.

Conclusion
The results from this study tend to support the hypothesis that the main impact of the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 to date has been on union presence and density rather
than on any change in the payments systems towards either enterprise bargaining or
individual contracts or a movement to single jurisdictions for the registration of
awards or agreements.
Substantial declines in the proportion of unionised workplaces and union workforce
density were recorded in the Illawarra, which parallels declines in the rest of
Australia. This occurred even though the Illawarra can be considered a traditional
industrial region and hence a stronghold for union activity. Much of this decline
occurred in private service sector workplaces. Encouragingly for unions perhaps, the
results support their ‘organising strategy’ approach with workplaces that had a
delegate presence in 1996 much less likely to lose their union presence than those that
did not. There was some indication that the protected action restrictions of the WRA
had affected the type of industrial actions that were occurring with a move to less
overt methods.
There was no significant move towards enterprise bargaining and away from Award
based systems to determine pay and conditions with the operation of the WRA. This
suggests that if the intention of further reducing the number of issues that can be
3

Of workplaces with agreements, for the panel dataset, 69% of firms with no trade union registered
agreements only in the NSW State system, while for those with a trade union 52% registered
agreements only in the State system. For the rest of the survey firms, 57% of firms with no trade union
registered agreements only in the NSW State system, while for those with a trade union 52% registered
agreements only in the State system.
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covered by awards is introduced, a large proportion of workers in the Illawarra now
predominantly reliant on awards to determine working conditions would be
significantly more vulnerable than under the current regime. In 2004, significantly
more workplaces, whether with agreements or not, made overaward payments than in
1996. This reflected the more buoyant economic and workforce conditions operating
in the second survey period. There was only a small increase in the use of non-union
agreements and virtually no uptake of AWAs. Thus, if the intention of the 1996 Act
was to encourage enterprise or individual bargaining, it was ineffective in this
objective. These results could be used either to argue that there was no need to
introduce such provisions beyond those already incorporated in the previous Labor
Government’s Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, or alternatively that they
demonstrate the need to strengthen the WRA as proposed in the 2000-2001
Amendments and in the current Government proposals.
Finally, the results show that the intention to encourage businesses to move into a
single jurisdiction and specifically the Federal jurisdiction for awards and collective
agreements has not been achieved. Rather, the movement has been towards multiple
jurisdictions and, in the case of agreements, towards the NSW State jurisdiction. The
current proposals to override the State jurisdiction and force workplaces into a single
Federal system would thus appear to be contrary to the choices currently being made
by workplaces, regardless of union status.
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APPENDIX A
COMPARISON OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
ILLAWARRA - 2004 AND 1996 (% of workplaces)

OUTCOMES

Panel Dataset
2004 1996

VARIABLE
EMPLOYER ASSOCIATIONS
Affiliated to Employer Association
Belong to:
Illawarra Business Chamber
Australian Industry Group
Chamber of Commerce
Club or Association
Other
Services Used:
Advice on awards or agreements
Represent in negotiation with unions/employees
Advice when management negotiate
Represent in industrial tribunals
Prepare model contracts / agreements
Advise on dismissals
Provision of employment relations training
Advice on EEO/AA
Advice on OH&S
Legal advice
Other services

IN

Total Sample
2004 1996

59.1

76.4

59

19.4
12.9
12.9
5.4
23.7

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

20
16
13
19
6

47.3
25.8
32.3
33.3
19.6
40.9
30.1
30.1
38.7
36.6
8.6

66.2
15.1
22.1
18.3
10.8
38.7
20.4
9.7
22.6
24.7
n.a.

49
27
34
28
21
42
29
29
33
35
7

60
22
20
26
15
49
25
16
28
37
19

PARTICIAPTION PRACTICES
Team building
Semi-autonomous work groups
TQM
Quality Circles
JCC
Taskforces

72.0
53.8
61.3
58.1
64.5
38.7

40.9
28.0
51.6
23.7
32.3
26.9

72
54
58
57
59
36

41
34
50
21
28
27

UNION PRESENCE
Trade Union present in workforce
Average number of unions
Delegate present
Average number of delegates

61.3
1.9
51.6
3.3

74.2
2.3
52.7
2.5

51
1.0
39
2.7

74
1.3
47
n.a.
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73
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

Panel Dataset
2004 1996

VARIABLE
Characteristics of management – union relations:
Cooperative and positive
Adversarial and positive
Adversarial and negative
Depends on the issue
Very good
Good
Neither good nor bad
Poor
Very poor
WORKPLACE REDUCTIONS
Average number of employees terminated for
reasons other than redundancies
Reduced workplace in last 12 months
Reasons for reducing workforce:
Lack of demand
Technological change
Organisational restructuring
Decrease costs / increase efficiency
Other
Method used to reduce workforce:
Natural wastage / attrition
Compulsory reductions / retrenchments
Voluntary reductions
Early retirements
Other
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY
Experience any industrial activity in last 12 months
Type of industrial activity:
Stop work meetings
Strikes
Overtime bans
Work to rule
Go slow
Picketing
Lockouts
Other

18

50.9
5.3
1.8
42.1

Total Sample
2004 1996

53
7
2
38
34.6
53.8
7.7
1.1
0.0

44
51
5
1
0

1.3
20.4

n.a.
25.8

1.6
22

n.a.
30

3.2
2.2
8.6
1.1
5.4

12.9
1.1
5.4
2.2
3.3

10
2
11
1
4

14
0
10
3
2

10.8
4.3
3.2
1.1
2.2

10.8
9.7
4.3
0.0
4.3

14
6
4
2
2

14
10
6
3
4

19.4

27.0

17

26

17.2
12.9
7.5
7.5
2.2
1.1
0.0
2.2

27.0
13.5
5.6
0.0
0.0
2.2
n.a.
4.5

11
7
4
4
1
1
0
5

23
18
7
4
3
3
n.a.
7

VARIABLE

Panel Dataset
2004 1996

Total Sample
2004 1996

95.7
2.3

96.6
2.4

94
2.5

98
n.a.

53.8
15.1
26.9
70.8
43.0
4.7

60.2
15.1
17.2
56.2
43.8
3.4

51
15
35
76
38
3.5

63
22
13
54
41
n.a.

PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Award coverage of employees
Average number of awards in workplace
Jurisdiction of Awards
State only
Federal only
Both
Make over award payments
Certified enterprise agreement in workplace
Average number of agreements
Jurisdiction of agreements:
State only
Federal only
Both
Non-certified collective agreement in workplace
Type:
AWA
Verbal agreement
Other Written

57.5
17.5
25.0
25.8

35.7
46.4
17.9
23.7

21
8
9
16

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

1.1
6.5
18.3

n.a.
16.1
n.a.

1.4
5
22

n.a.
12
n.a.

WORKPLACE CHARACTERISTICS
Average number of employees:
Average number full time employees
Average number part time employees
Average number of employees in total
Total employment in these workplaces
Unionised workforce – total members
Average number of unionists
Union density

63.1
27.8
90.9
8449
3642
39.2
43.1

n.a.
n.a.
92.0
8277
5433
83.6
65.6

65.9
26.2
92
19533
7601
35.9
39

Size of firms:
Small firms - Less than 20 employees
Small medium firms – 20 to 49 employees
Medium firms – 50 – 99 employees
Large medium firms– 100 to 199 employees
Large firms – 200 or more employees

14
30
22
18
9

0
42
23
13
12

19

17
42
17
{25
{

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
65

0
64
21
{16
{

CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLES

Panel Dataset
2004/1996

Total Sample
2004 1996

Industry Sector
Mining and manufacturing
Utilities
Construction
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Hospitality
Transport and storage
Communications
Finance and insurance
Property and business services
Government administration and defence
Education
Health and community services
Cultural and personal services

22.6
1.1
6.5
5.4
10.8
4.3
5.4
4.3
3.2
10.8
2.2
5.4
8.6
9.7

23
1
7
{20
{
4
4
2
{11
{
2
4
8
15

15
3
6
{19
{
11
6
3
{10
{
7
8
9
4

Sector:
Private
Public

80.6
19.4

85
15

69
31

Exporter

20.4

19

18

20

